COMMENTS

Why Time Limits on the Ratification of
Constitutional Amendments Violate Article V
Mason Kalfust
The 106th Congress, like the Republican-controlled 105th
and 104th Congresses before it, will likely consider a variety of
constitutional amendments-from allowing Congress to prohibit
flag desecration to forcing Congress to pass a balanced budget.'
Like every amendment that Congress has proposed in the last
seventy-four years, any proposed amendment will likely contain a
seven-year time limit in which the States must ratify it.2 Congress uses these time limits to avoid the uncertainty of having
amendments linger indefinitely before the States. But are these
congressional time limits merely innocuous additions of conven-
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See Kathleen Sullivan, ConstitutionalConstancy: Why Congress Should Cure Itself

of Amendment Fever, 17 Cardozo L Rev 691 (1996). See also Amendment Fever, NY Times
A22 (Jun 25, 1998); Abner Mikva, Mickey Edwards, and Jim Courter, Casual Use of
Amendments Poses Threat,Natl L J A21 (Sept 29, 1997); David S. Broder, Fast and Loose
with the Constitution,Wash Post A23 (July 2, 1997).
2 For example, H J Res 54, An Amendment Authorizing Congress to Prohibit
the
Physical Desecration of the Flag of the United States, reads:
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America
in Congress (two-thirds of each House concurring therein), that the following article
is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which shall be
valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States, within seven years after the date of its
submission for ratification.
H J Res 54, 105th Cong, 1st Sess (introduced Feb 13, 1997) (emphasis added), passed the
House of Representatives on June 18, 1997, reported favorably out of the Senate Judiciary
Committee on June 24, 1998, never voted on by the full Senate.
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ience, or are they something more-a manipulation of Article V
that compromises the amendment process?
Article V of the United States Constitution reads:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall
deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two
thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid to
all Intents and Purposes, as part of this Constitution, when
ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several
States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one
or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by Congress.3
Although the Supreme Court approved Congress's power to
fix time limits to constitutional amendments in the 1921 case of
Dillon v Gloss,4 the years since have been marked by significant
changes in the way the Court views the Constitution. Recent
cases, including INS v Chadha5 and Clinton v City of New York,6
have made strong statements about the Court's unwillingness to
disrupt constitutional allocations of power. But Dillon, decided
long before the Court could appreciate the ability of time limits to
disrupt the Article V balance of power, remains good law. This
Comment examines the misunderstood power of time limits, suggests a new way of analyzing them, and ultimately concludes that
they violate the text and purpose of Article V.
I.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME LIMITS

A. The Eighteenth Amendment and Dillon v Gloss
When Congress passed the Eighteenth Amendment,7 it attached a time limit on the States' ratification for the first time.8
' US Const, Art V.
256 US 368 (1921).
' 462 US 919 (1983) (holding that the one-house legislative veto violates the Presentment Clause of Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution).
6 118 S Ct 2091 (1998) (holding that the Line Item Veto Act violates the Presentment
Clause of Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution).
The Eighteenth Amendment reads:
Section 1. After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale, or
transportation of intoxicating liquors... is hereby prohibited....
Section 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an
amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of the several States, as provided
in the Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submission hereof to the
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Several senators who supported the Amendment attacked this
new practice.9 Senator William E. Borah"° cautioned that "[a]s the
Constitution now exists, there is no limitation upon the time
within which the States may ratify an amendment."" Senator
Borah was unable to convince a majority of the Senate, however,
and a compromise eventually led to a seven-year time limit. 2 The
amendment passed Congress in December of 1917 and was ratified in January of 1919."
A year later the amendment was challenged. In 1920, J.J.
Dillon was arrested for transporting intoxicating liquors'4 in violation of the National Prohibition Act, which implemented the
Eighteenth Amendment. 5 Dillon applied to the district court for
habeas corpus relief on several grounds, among them that the
amendment was void because it had been submitted to the states
with a time limit. 6 District Judge Frank F. Rudkin 7 rejected this
argument, ruling that although Article V did not expressly allow
time limits, neither did it forbid them."
States by the Congress.
US Const, Amend XVIII (emphasis added).
8 Opponents of the Fourteenth Amendment tried unsuccessfully to attach a threeyear time limit. See 36 Cong Globe 2771 (1866) (statement of the presiding officer).
' See 55 Cong Rec S 5649 (Aug 1, 1917) (statement of Sen Borah); id at 5650 (statement of Sen Brandegee); id at 5652 (statement of Sen Cummins); id at 5658-59 (statement
of Sen Vardaman).
" Borah, who represented the State of Idaho, served in the Senate for approximately
thirty-four years and was one of the most respected senators of his day.
n Id at 5649 (statement of Sen Borah).
56 Cong Rec H 424 (Dec 17, 1917) (statement of Rep Webb). The seven-year compromise that developed in the Senate, between the "drys" (who wanted eight years) and
the "wets" (who wanted six years), has been the limit on every constitutional amendment
that has contained a limit.
' See John R. Vile, Encyclopedia of Constitutional Amendments, Proposed Amendments, and Amending Issues, 1789-1995 Appendix B at 361 (ABC-CLIO 1996).
"Dillon, 256 US at 370.
Ex ParteDillon, 262 F 563, 564-67 (N D Cal 1920). See National Prohibition Act, 41
Stat 305, ch 85 (Oct 28, 1919) (repealed 1933).
" Dillon argued the amendment did not take effect until one year after January 29,
1919, when the Secretary of State actually promulgated the amendment, even though the
last required state had ratified on January 16, 1919. He also argued that the ratifications
of Washington and Ohio were either not completed until after January 16, 1919 (Washington) or not completed at all (Ohio), based on decisions of the highest courts of those states.
See Ex Parte Dillon, 262 F at 564-65. District Judge Rudkin rejected all of these arguments. Id at 564-67.
" Judge Rudkin was a distinguished jurist who later served on the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals and was rumored to be in line for the Supreme Court seat that eventually went to Owen H. Roberts. See Peter G. Fish, Perspectiveson the Selection of Federal
Judges, 77 Ky L J 545, 556-61 (1989). Still, his opinion in Ex Parte Dillon contains many
errors, most notably his repeated references to Article V as the Fifth Amendment. Ex
ParteDillon, 262 F at 565-66.
8 Ex ParteDillon, 262 F at 567.
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On appeal, the Supreme Court in a unanimous opinion affirmed the district court's ruling. Seeking to clarify why time
limits do not violate Article V, the Court analyzed the purpose of
time limits, and observed that it did "not find anything in the Article which suggests that an amendment once proposed is to be
open to ratification for all time, or that ratification in some of the
States may be separated from that in others by many years and
yet be effective." 9 To illustrate the point, the Court brought up
four ancient amendments pending before the States and described as "untenable" the proposition that states could still ratify
those amendments. The Court explained that "the fair inference
or implication from Article V is that the ratification must be
within some reasonable time after the proposal." °
With virtually no historical or legal precedent to guide it, the
Court forged an opinion from implications and inferences drawn
from a textual reading of Article V.2 1 After concluding that ratification must be within "some reasonable time," the Court turned
to Congress's ability to set that time at the outset of the ratification process: "Of the power of Congress, keeping within reasonable limits, to fix a definite period for the ratification we entertain no doubt."2
With constitutional clearance from the Court, Congress continued to attach time limits to constitutional amendments. Ironically, the only post-Dillon amendment that Congress proposed
without a time limit led to the Court's clarification of Dillon, in a
case that now dominates Article V jurisprudence.

Dillon, 256 US at 374.
Id at 375. The Court was proven wrong seventy-one years later with the 1992 ratification of an amendment written by James Madison that was proposed in 1789. See Part
l.A.2. The other three amendments to which the Court referred were (1) a Madison
amendment that would reapportion the House (under the amendments formula, using
1999 population figures, the amendment would allow the House to expand to include as
many as 5000 members), (2) an 1810 amendment that would strip the citizenship of all
Americans who accept titles of nobility from foreign nations, and (3) an 1861 amendment
that would remove Congress's power to ban slavery. See Richard L. Berke, More Amendments Lurk in the Mists of History, NY Times § 4 at 2 (May 24, 1992).
21 The Court noted, "Neither the debates in the federal convention which framed the
Constitution nor those in the state conventions which ratified it shed any light on the
question" of whether Congress may impose time limits on ratification. 256 US at 371. As
this Comment argues, while nothing was explicitly spoken by the Framers on time limits,
other principles valued by the Framers, such as separation of powers and preservation of
States' rights, speak powerfully on this issue and serve as guidance that the Dillon Court,
understandably naive about the power of time limits, ignored. See Part I.
Id at 375-76.
"
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Coleman v Miller

In Coleman v Miller,23 the Supreme Court confronted the
natural question raised by Dillon-what is a "reasonable time"
for ratification in the absence of a limit set by Congress?24 The
Court, however, refused to supply an answer, holding the issue to
be a nonjusticiable political question that Congress has the exclusive power to decide.2 5
The case began in 1922, when the Court invalidated the second of two attempts by Congress to regulate child labor.26 Congress responded by proposing the Child Labor Amendment, which
provided: "Congress shall have power to limit, regulate, and prohibit the labor of persons under eighteen years of age."2 7 With little debate, various efforts to attach a time limit to the amendment failed,28 and Congress sent the amendment to the States
without a time limit.
At first, the amendment failed dismally in the ratification
process. At the end of 1931, seven years after its proposal, only
six states had ratified the amendment and nineteen states had
formally rejected it.29 But by 1933, the amendment had gained
popularity and fourteen states had ratified it (including four that
had previously rejected it).3 °
In 1937, Kansas, which had rejected the amendment in
1925,"' voted again on ratification. The Kansas Senate split
twenty to twenty on ratification. The Lieutenant Governor, acting
in his capacity as presiding officer of the Senate, broke the tie
and voted for ratification.32 After the Kansas House of Representatives approved the amendment, twenty-one members of the
Senate and three members of the House brought suit challenging
the ratification of the amendment." The Supreme Court of Kan- 307 US 433 (1939).
24 Id at 451.

Id at 454.
See The ChildLabor Tax Case, 259 US 20 (1922) (holding Congress's tax on employers who employ child labor to be invalid). The first congressional attempt to regulate child
labor was invalidated in Hammer v Dagenhart,247 US 251 (1918) (holding Congress could
not prohibit the shipment, in interstate commerce, of goods made by young children).
H J Res 184, 68th Cong, 1st Sess (June 2, 1924), in 43 Stat 670 (1924).
In the House, Representative J.C. Linthicum of Maryland tried to attach limits of
five years and seven years; both were rejected. 65 Cong Rec H 7288-89, 7293 (Apr 26,
1924). Meanwhile, in the Senate, efforts by Senator Duncan Fletcher of Florida to attach a
five-year limit were overwhelmingly defeated. 65 Cong Rec S 10141 (June 2, 1924).
See Coleman, 307 US at 473 n * (Frankfurter dissenting).
See id.
31See id at 435.
See id at 436.
See id.
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sas denied relief, and the legislators successfully petitioned the
U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.3 4
The petitioning legislators argued that the ratification was
invalid because of the 1925 rejection of the Amendment and because the amendment had "lapsed in time" since its submission."
The Court addressed the issue raised by Kansas's previous rejection by examining the historical precedent of the ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment. In that instance, North Carolina
and South Carolina had rejected the amendment in 1866 but ratified it two years later.3 6 Conversely, Ohio and New Jersey ratified
the amendment, but subsequently passed resolutions withdrawing their ratification." Congress, after receiving a list-including
these four states-adopted a concurrent resolution "promulgating" the Fourteenth Amendment. Relying on this historical
precedent of Congress deciding questionable issues relating to
ratification," the Court determined the legitimacy of state ratification to be a nonjusticiable political question. 9
The Court then turned to the issue of whether the amendment had expired because the time for ratification had lapsed.
The petitioning legislators argued that, in the absence of a congressional time limit, the Court should decide what constitutes a
reasonable time for ratification." The Court ruled, however, that
this too was a nonjusticiable political question.4 The "question of
a reasonable time [for ratification] . . . involve[s], an appraisal of

303 US 632 (1937).
Coleman, 307 US at 447. Petitioners also argued that the Lieutenant Governor was
not authorized to break the tie in the Senate, as Article V mentioned only the legislature
of the States. The Court, despite being at a full nine members, inexplicably claimed it was
equally divided on this point and issued no opinion on it. Id at 446-47.
The new governments in these states were elected under the supervision of Congress during Reconstruction. Id at 448.
3 Id.
"Id at 448-49. Many commentators have pointed out the absurdity of the Court's reliance on this historical precedent. Later Acting Solicitor General Walter Dellinger identified several key flaws. First and perhaps most significant, congressional promulgation is
mentioned nowhere in Article V. Second, Congress had never before and (until the bizarre
case of the Twenty-seventh Amendment in 1992) never again "promulgated" an amendment. Third, this idea contradicted numerous Supreme Court precedents, most notably
Dillon, which specifically held that ratification occurred upon ratification by the last necessary state. See Walter Dellinger, The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change: Rethinking
the Amendment Process, 97 Harv L Rev 386, 397-403 (1983). See also Equal Rights
Amendment Extension Hearings on H J Res 638 before the Subcommittee on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong, 1st and 2d Sess 72
(1977-78) (statement of Prof Charles L. Black) (calling the promulgation precedent "so
thin it would break ifa cat walked on it").
307 US at 450.
Id at 452.
41

Id at 454.
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a great variety of relevant conditions, political, social and economic, which can hardly be said to be within the appropriate
range of evidence receivable in a court of justice ....On the other
hand, conditions are appropriate for the consideration of the political departments of the Government."4 2 In so ruling, the Court
took all Article V questions relating to the timeliness of amendment ratification and placed them with Congress, where they
have remained ever since.
C.

The Equal Rights Amendment: A Missed Opportunity to
Reconsider Dillon

After Coleman, Congress again took up its practice of attaching time limits to proposed amendments before sending them
to the States for ratification. When Congress proposed the
Twenty-third Amendment,4 3 however, it adjusted its practice
slightly by moving the time limit from the amendment's actual
text to its proposing clause." This move allowed Congress to
avoid "cluttering up" the Constitution with time limit provisions
that serve no purpose once ratification is complete.4"
4 Id at 453-54.
The Twenty-third Amendment grants residents of the District of Columbia the
power to vote in presidential elections. US Const, Amend XXII.
" Because this Comment focuses on the nature of time limits to alter and disrupt the
balance of power inherent in Article V, no distinction is made between "textual" time limits and those in the proposing clause. Still, it is worth addressing two theories that attempt to insulate textual time limits from all constitutional claims. The first of these theories was brought up during the debate over the Eighteenth Amendment. During the debate, some members of Congress argued that the time limit provision, because it was being adopted as constitutional text, in effect changed the Constitution for the amendment
in question (that is, even if time limits were not authorized, the individual amendment
specifically authorized them for this instance). See 55 Cong Rec S 5649 (Aug 1, 1917)
(statement of Sen Stone). But, as Senator Borah pointed out, this argument fails because
the time limit, in order to be effective, needs to have the force of law-which of course it
does not have until the amendment is actually ratified. Id (statement of Sen Borah).
Dellinger raises a second argument: that the textual time limit provision acts as a sort
of "time bomb" that causes the amendment to self-destruct if the amendment is ratified after expiration. Dellinger, 97 Harv L Rev at 409 (cited in note 38). While this argument is
even more rhetorically compelling, it assumes Congress's power to insert text in constitutional amendments is unlimited. Suppose Congress inserted a provision requiring the
amendment to be ratified by all of the States. This provision certainly would violate the
Constitution, and would not be permitted-much as the Court in Dillon specifically refused to allow Congress to insert unreasonable time limits. Dillon, 256 US at 375-76. The
argument of this Comment is essentially that all time limits are unreasonable, in the
sense that they violate constitutional text and purpose in a manner of which the Dillon
Court was unaware.
',Columbia Law School Professor Noel Dowling suggested this strategy when asked
for comments on a proposed twenty-third amendment (which never passed Congress). See
Appointment of Representatives, Hearing on S J Res 8 before a Subcommittee of the
Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong, 1st Sess Appendix at 34 (Mar 15, 1955) (letter of
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Seventeen years later, as expiration of the seven-year limit
on the proposed Equal Rights Amendment ("ERA") approached,
Congress found that its innovation had another use: because the
time limit was in the proposing clause-and not the text-Congress determined it could extend the deadline for ratification by
amending the proposing clause.4 6 ERA opponents objected that
the extension was unconstitutional,4 7 but Congress extended the
deadline by more than three years.48
In 1981, the extension was ruled null and void by an Idaho
district court.49 On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the decision as moot because, by the time the case reached the Court, the
extension-and the time for ratification-had expired.5" As the
first amendment to expire, the ERA has the potential to force the
Court to reconsider Dillon. But because no state has yet ratified
the amendment after its expiration, and no other legal injury has
been brought before a court, the ERA has failed to allow the
Court to reconsider Dillon.
D.

Justiciability of Time Limits

Coleman effectively removed consideration of all issues of
timeliness of ratification from the judiciary by ruling that timeliness is a nonjusticiable political question. Nonetheless, there are
compelling reasons to believe that the Supreme Court today
would consider whether Congress has the ability to explicitly
limit the States' ratification window.
There are two reasons why Coleman would not necessarily
bind a modern court. First, Coleman was a mysterious departure
from Dillon and other cases in which the Court had ruled on Article V issues of ratification.5 ' Prior to Coleman, justiciability was
Prof Noel T. Dowling). See also 101 Cong Rec S 6628 (May 19, 1955) (statement of Sen Kefauver) (explaining the reasons for placing the time limit in the proposing clause, as opposed to the text of the amendment).
See Equal Rights Amendment Extension Hearings on H J Res 638 121, 124 (cited in
note 38) (statement of then-Professor Ruth Bader Ginsburg) ("Congress did not place the
'reasonable time' determination beyond its further control by fixing the ratification period
in the text of the amendment .... Rather, Congress expressed an initial judgment as to
time, but it separated that preliminary judgment from the text of the proposed amendment submitted to the states. Congress thereby retained authority to extend the period,
should 'the public interests' and 'relevant conditions' so warrant.").
See, for example, 124 Cong Rec S 33150-51 (Oct 6, 1978) (statement of Sen Helms).
124 Cong Rec H 26264-65 (Aug 15, 1978) (House vote); 124 Cong Rec S 34314-15
(Oct 6, 1978) (Senate vote).
" Idaho v Freeman, 529 F Supp 1107 (D Idaho 1981), cert before judgment granted,
455 US 918, vacated as NOW v Idaho, 459 US 809 (1982).
" NOW v Idaho, 459 US at 809 (order).
51 See United States v Sprague,282 US 716, 730 (1931) (holding that ratification of the
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not a live issue in these cases. The Coleman departure is all the
more perplexing because the Court either ignored these cases
where it had ruled on Article V issues or cited them approvingly. 2
Thus, Coleman seems less instructive on the issue of justiciability
because of the other, contradictory precedent.
Second, and more importantly, many scholars considering
Coleman have noted that the standards for justiciability used in
Coleman have been modified in modern jurisprudence. Under the
Court's reformulation of the political question doctrine in Baker v
Carr5 3 and Powell v McCormack, 4 the Court would likely not
avoid any ratification questions.5 Many scholars have concluded
that the Court's reformulation of political question analysis, coupled with Coleman's conflict with Court precedent, render Coleman "dead.""6

Eighteenth Amendment by legislatures, as. opposed to conventions, was permissible); Leser v Garnett,258 US 130, 136 (1922) (holding that granting women voting power was an
appropriate use of the amending power); Hawke v Smith, 253 US 221, 231 (1920) (holding
that states may not condition ratification on a referendum of its voters); National Prohibition Cases, 253 US 350, 386 (1920) (holding that a two-thirds vote of a quorum of each
house of Congress is sufficient to propose an amendment); Hollingsworth v Virginia, 3 US
(3 Dall) 378, 381 (1798) (holding that Congress need not present amendments to the
President for signature).
Coleman, 307 US at 438-41, 452-53.
369 US 186, 217-26 (1962) (holding that complaint alleging denial of equal protection based on Tennessee apportionment statute was justiciable because it did not present
a question to be decided by a political branch of government coequal with the Court, did
not concern foreign relations, and did not ask the court to enter into policy determinations
for which judicially manageable standards were lacking).
395 US 486, 518-22 (1969) (holding that cases requiring an interpretation of the
Constitution, and thus a determination for which there are judicially manageable standards, are not barred by the political question doctrine).
' In Baker the Court for the first time decided issues of State apportionment of legislative districts-which required the Court to make an appraisal of the type of political, social, and economic conditions that the Court refused to make in Coleman. See Grover Rees
III, Throwing Away the Key: The Unconstitutionalityof the Equal Rights Amendment Extension, 58 Tex L Rev 875, 888 (1980). See also Peter H. Wolf, An Antireapportionment
Amendment: Can it be Legally Ratified?, 52 ABA J 326, 329 (1966) ("Baker should also
permit a return from the deviation in Coleman to the line of cases that have considered
without hesitation the validity of ratification of constitutional amendments.").
Likewise in Powell, the Court decided that the House of Representatives had no power
to exclude Adam Clayton Powell from his seat in Congress, thus entering an area of congressional power far more "political" than the area it refused to enter in Coleman. See
Rees, 58 Tex L Rev at 888.
' See Rees, 58 Tex L Rev at 930 (cited in note 55). Other commentators agree with
this position. Dellinger calls Coleman an "aberration" and argues it is "profoundly wrong"
and "should no longer be followed." Dellinger, 97 Harv L Rev at 388-89 (cited in note 38).
See also Akhil Reed Amar, PhiladelphiaRevisited: Amending the Constitution OutsideArticlee V, 55 U Chi L Rev 1043, 1046 n 3 (1988) (rejecting the language in Coleman that issues surrounding the amendment process are nonjusticiable); Michael Stokes Paulsen, A
General Theory of Article V.- The ConstitutionalLessons of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 103 Yale L J 677, 717 (1993) ("Coleman may simply not be authoritative at all.").

The University of Chicago Law Review

[66:437

Furthermore, even if the Court were to reaffirm Coleman, it
could nonetheless overrule Dillon, as the two cases presented distinct and separable issues. Dillon raised the question of whether
the proposing Congress could attach a time limit on ratification.5 7
The Court ruled that time limits did not exceed the scope of congressional authority under Article V.5" Coleman, on the other
hand, considered who (which branch) should determine the time
for passage of an amendment; the Court held that, if the proposing Congress did not set a time limit, the judiciary is not to say
which time limits are reasonable.5 9
In Coleman, the Court spoke of "an appraisal of a great variety of relevant conditions, political, social and economic . . .
[which are appropriate for] the political departments of the Government." ° But the issues involved in Congress's basic ability to
insert a time limit involve no such "appraisal"; rather, the only
issue is whether Congress has acted within its authority under
Article V.61 Thus, the question considered in Dillon relates to the
meaning of Article V-a question that is entirely within the
province of the judicial branch.2
II.

CHALLENGES TO DILLON

Dillon's dictum-that ratification must be "contemporaneous" with proposal-is far more exceptional than its holdingthat Congress may attach an explicit time limit on ratification. Before Dillon, the Supreme Court had never even suggested that
ratification must be "contemporaneous" with the proposing of an
amendment.6" If the dictum is correct, the holding is but a tiny
addendum to it: if ratification must be contemporaneous, it seems
reasonable that Congress has the power to determine what "contemporaneous" means. If, however, the dictum is incorrect and
ratification need not be contemporaneous, then the power of Congress to force contemporaneous ratification through time limits
must be found, as the Court claims, in the text of Article V. Although the Court's holding is the subject of this Comment, this
"

256 US at 375-77.
Id.

307 US at 454.
Id at 453-54.
61 Furthermore, overruling Dillon while leaving Coleman intact remains true to the
theory behind Coleman-that timeliness involves an appraisal of a variety of conditions.
Only the "accepting" Congress could accurately make those determinations.
"See City of Boerne v Flores, 521 US 507, 117 S Ct 2157, 2166 (1997) ('The power to
interpret the Constitution in a case or controversy remains in the Judiciary.").
"Dillon, 256 US at 375. It should be noted, however, that prior to Dillon the issue had
not been raised before the Court.
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Part begins by demonstrating how recent scholarship and history
have exposed the numerous flaws in the dictum. It then examines
the true power of time limits in a way previously unconsidered
and explains why time limits are not mere matters of detail.
A.

Why Ratification Need Not Be Contemporaneous
1.

The weakness of the textual basis for Dillon'sdictum.

Dillon offers only thin textual support for the proposition
that ratification must be contemporaneous. The Court's threepart textual analysis begins with the statement that "proposal
and ratification are not treated as unrelated acts but as succeeding steps in a single endeavor, the natural inference being that
they are not to be widely separated in time."' As Professor Michael Paulsen explains, "this argument... largely restates intuition. As a legal argument, it is imprecise."5 There is nothing in
Article V that suggests or mandates that the "succeeding steps"
must be related in time. The Twenty-seventh Amendment's ratification by the States in the twentieth century, for example, was
a succeeding step to Congress's proposal of the amendment--but
surely its ratification was not "related" in time to the original
proposal in the sense the Dillon Court meant.66
Second, the Court suggested that "it is only when there is
deemed to be a necessity therefor that amendments are to be
proposed, the reasonable implication being that when proposed
they are to be considered and disposed of presently." 7 This argument, however, fails both logically and historically. Logically,
there is no reason to assume that States must ratify an amendment quickly simply because Congress believes the amendment is
necessary. There is no "level of necessity" that the Constitution
requires for each proposed amendment. Instead, the States have
a role in determining the extent to which an amendment is
needed" by ratifying an amendment only when and if they deId at 374-75.
Paulsen, 103 Yale L J at 689 (cited in note 56).
Id. Others who have examined Dillon's dictum have also noted the unconvincing circular reasoning of this first argument. The Department of Justice, in a memorandum for
C. Boyden Gray, Counsel to the President, concerning the validity of the Twenty-seventh
Amendment, agrees with the position that the first argument of Dillon's dictum is merely
circular reasoning. The Congressional Pay Amendment, 16 Op OLC vol 63 102 (1992)
(memorandum of Timothy E. Flanigan, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel). Flanigan writes, 'This argument simply assumes its conclusion-that the process is
to be short rather than lengthy." Id at 111.
Dillon, 256 US at 375.
This is evident from the States' participation in the ratification process. Their participation may not be waived or passed over by the Congress, simply because an amend-
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termine it to be necessary.6 9 Historically, nothing suggests that
the necessity of a proposed amendment mandates its quick ratification. As Paulsen observed, "the perceived need for an amendment might even increase over time as a problem becomes more
and more acute."' For example, the Child Labor Amendment began to pick up momentum only in 1933. During the nine years
immediately following its proposal, only six states had ratified
it. 1 Similarly, the Twenty-seventh Amendment was not perceived
as necessary-and consequently ratified-until two hundred
years after its proposal." These two historical examples demonstrate that the speed of ratification and Congress's perception of
the amendment's necessity need not be linked. 3
The Court's third textual argument suggests that, "as ratification is but the expression of the approbation of the people...
there is a fair implication that it must ... reflect the will of the
people in all sections at relatively the same period, which of
course ratification scattered through a long series of years would
not do." 4 While this sounds reasonable, it contains two errors.
First, it assumes that consensus must be achieved "contemporaneously." Consensus, however, often can be reached only over
decades--both practically and theoretically. Practically, it often
takes years to achieve consensus, especially on fundamental social or political changes that constitutional amendments often
implicate. As Professor Thomas I. Emerson notes, "History has
demonstrated that a long period of time is necessary for the nation to make up its mind with respect to fundamental changes.
... [T]he Women's Suffrage Amendment was under consideration

ment is necessary. Neither Congress nor the States have any constitutional (as opposed to
political) ability to influence the other's ratification-thus evidencing the equality of their
participation. Because no distinction is made (or in any way suggested) in the Constitution
between amendments of greater or lesser necessity, each participant has an equal role in
determining necessity.

US Const, Art V.
Paulsen, 103 Yale L J at 690 (cited in note 56).
71 Before 1933, only six states had ratified the amendment whereas nineteen had for-

mally rejected it. In 1933, fourteen states ratified the amendment. See Coleman, 307 US
at 473 n * (Frankfurter dissenting).
Paulsen, 103 Yale L J at 690-91 (cited in note 56).
While the two instances may seem to be, at first glance, mere historical oddities,
they are extremely significant when considered in context. Not including the Bill of
Rights, only thirteen amendments have passed the Congress without time limits
(Amendments Eleven through Seventeen, Nineteen, and Twenty-seven, as well as the
Child Labor Amendment and the three other live amendments cited in note 20). Furthermore, since eight of these thirteen amendments were ratified within four years, only five
had the potential for "untimely" ratification. Of the five, two acquired significant momentum towards ratification more than seven years after proposal.
'" Dillon, 256 US at 375.
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for nearly three quarters of a century."7" Theoretically, the Constitution remains in effect precisely because there is an
intergenerational consensus. One generation of Americans cannot
use the Constitution to impose burdens on future ones; rather, future generations must consent to be bound by the ideas of previous generations. As Paulsen points out: "No one alive today voted
for the Constitution or the Bill of Rights .... Popular sovereignty
in our system is something more than a present snapshot of public opinion; it is the will of the people as expressed through the
7"
mechanisms establishedfor its measurement and aggregation."
Moreover, the need for consensus is entirely a creation of the
Dillon Court. Consensus is mentioned nowhere in the Constitution. The Framers did consider consensus to be an essential element of the amending process-it seems inherently obvious that
they designed Article V with a goal of consensus in mind7 7 by setting up a rigorous requirement of proposal and ratification to
achieve it. That said, however, the constitutionally mandated
procedures suffice to achieve consensus. It is unnecessary and incorrect to mandate the additional requirement that consensus be
contemporaneous. As Walter Dellinger argues:
The goal of consensus is sufficiently served by the explicit
requirement that amendments be proposed by two-thirds of
both houses of Congress. The additional requirement that at
some time before a proposed amendment becomes effective
there be a formal act of acceptance by thirty-eight state legislatures both serves the ends of federalism and aids in the
ascertainment of consensus.7"
The procedures of Article V are explicit and thorough. They
serve the goals of consensus the Framers realized were essential
to the amending process. An amendment is valid upon compliance with the rules of Article V. In other contexts, when the
Framers wanted to set a time limit, they did so explicitly.79 The
Court made a grievous departure from the text of Article V when,
in dictum, it inserted a requirement of contemporaneous ratification into the amendment procedure."0
Equal Rights Amendment Extension Hearings: Hearings on S J Res 134 Before the
Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong,
2d Sess 132, 134-35 (1978) (prepared statement of ProfThomas I. Emerson).
Paulsen, 103 Yale L J at 695-96 (cited in note 56).
Dellinger, 97 Harv L Rev at 418 (cited in note 38).

Id at 418-19.
See Paulsen, 103 Yale L J at 694 n 54 (cited in note 56) (pointing out numerous examples of specific time limits the Framers delineated in the Constitution).
"Dellinger and Paulsen agree with this conclusion. See Dellinger, 97 Harv L Rev at
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Dillon's dictum-abandoned by history.

The Dillon Court's requirement that ratification be contemporaneous remained irrelevant for seventy-one years after it was
announced.8 Its weaknesses were exposed in 1992, when Michigan completed the States' ratification of the Twenty-seventh
Amendment." (Ironically, the Court in Dillon had cited the
amendment as an illustration of amendments whose contemporaneous ratification was no longer possible. 3 ) Congress's acceptance of the amendment sounded the death knell of the dormant
dictum.
Most scholars who debated Congress's role in the Twentyseventh Amendment agreed that Congress had no role to play in
"accepting" the amendment.' These scholars reasoned that the
formal requirements of Article V had been met;" that Congress

388-89, 419 (cited in note 38); Paulsen, 103 Yale L J at 696 (cited in note 56). This was
also the conclusion of Assistant Attorney General Flanigan. See The Congressional Pay
Amendment, 16 Op OLC at 111-15 (cited in note 66) ("[T]he reasoning of [the dictum in]
Dillon is unpersuasive in both its specific arguments and in its broader methodology ...
The implicit time limit thesis is thus deeply implausible, because it introduces hopeless
uncertainty into that part of the Constitution that must function with a maximum of formal clarity if it is to function.").
" The focus of Coleman was not a challenge to Dillon's dictum-merely further explanation of it.
' One could argue that the Madison Congressional Pay Amendment was actually ratified "contemporaneously." But such an argument would assume that Congress appraised
the relevant conditions and determined that the States' ratification was contemporaneous.
Such an argument seems implausible. As Dellinger noted (nine years prior to its ratification), whatever "contemporaneous" means, the Madison Amendment clearly was not. See
97 Harv L Rev at 425 (cited in note 38) ("The amendments proposed in 1789, 1810, and
1861 raise no problems: they simply died.").
Dillon, 256 US at 375.
,Several legal scholars supported congressional acceptance of the Amendment. See
Bill McAllister, Across Two Centuries, a FounderUpdates the Constitution,Wash Post Al
(May 14, 1992) (quoting Professor Laurence Tribe, "It is not Congress's role to declare
Michigan's 1992 ratification too recent or Maryland's 1789 ratification too ancient," and
Dellinger, "My own view is that Congress has no formal role to play"); Laurence H. Tribe,
The 27th Amendment Joins the Constitution,Wall St J A15 (May 13, 1992). Needless to
say, not every legal scholar believed Congress st±ould have accepted the amendment. See
John R. Vile, Just Say No to 'Stealth'Amendment,Natl L J 15 (June 22, 1992). Still, Congress accepted the amendment and signaled an end to Dillon's constitutional requirement
of contemporaneous ratification. To the extent Coleman is still in force, see Part I.D, Congress may still, on its own, require contemporaneous ratification. Other scholars have argued that the contemporaneous requirement remains in force, for purposes of ensuring
consensus, and ought to be enforced by the judiciary. See Stewart Dalzell and Eric J.
Beste, Is the Twenty-Seventh Amendment 200 Years Too Late?, 62 Geo Wash L Rev 502,
504-05 (1994).
"See McAllister, Across Two Centuries, Wash Post at Al (cited in note 84) (quoting
Dellinger).
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had missed its chance to set a time limit;86 or that a consensus
had been achieved "over time."87
Congress believed that there was no requirement of contemporaneous ratification and accepted the amendment. The academic community noted that Congress's actions with the Twentyseventh Amendment challenged Dillon's requirement that ratification be contemporaneous." The "consensus" to abandon this requirement essentially overruled Dillon's dictum. However, even
those who agree with this conclusion have not yet questioned Dillon's holding and asked whether Congress may insert time limits
on ratification when it proposes amendments.89
If one rejects the dictum of Dillon (amendments must be ratified contemporaneously with their proposal) and the holding of
Coleman (Congress has the exclusive power to decide issues of
ratification), a problem arises-what support is there for the
holding in Dillon?
B. Why the Constitution Does Not Allow Time Limits
Dillon's holding, standing alone, proves even thinner than its
dictum. The Court's holding that Article V does not prohibit time
limits stems from two main arguments: (1) nothing in the text of
the Article V addresses time limits; and (2) because time limits
are only "subsidiary matters of detail," they may be allowed.9
Both arguments, however, are incorrect.
1.

The Constitution's text does not support the
holding of Dillon.

Establishing a foundation for its holding, the Dillon Court
asserted that there is nothing in Article V "which suggests that
an amendment once proposed is to be open to ratification for all
time."' This statement, however, ignores Article V's language.
The Constitution specifies that amendments are valid "when ratiSee id.
See Tribe, The 27th Amendment, Wall St J at A15 (cited in note 84) ("Does a political wildfire that sweeps the nation and then bunas itself out reflect more of a consensus
than a ratification trajectory spanning the centuries and representing a considered judgment shared across generations?").
See, for example, Allison L. Held, Sheryl L. Herndon, and Danielle M. Stager, The
Equal Rights Amendment: Why the ERA Remains Legally Viable and Properly Before the
States, 3 Wm & Mary J Women & L 113, 121-23 (1997).
' See Paulsen, 103 Yale L J at 687, 688-96 (cited in note 56) (arguing that the holding
of Dillon "seems obviously correct," and later concluding that the justifications for the Dillon Court's requirement of contemporaneous ratification are unpersuasive).
"Dillon, 256 US at 374, 376.
9'Id at 374.
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fled."92 The phrase "when ratified" is the only reference in Article
V to time limitations on amendments. It does not say "when ratified according to the terms of Congress"; rather, it specifies simply "when ratified." However vague, the text addresses the issue
at hand, and potentially suggests that amendments, once proposed, are to be left entirely to the States until ratification. 3
The Court used Article V's silence only to lay a foundation for
its primary holding; it rested its holding on the triviality of time
limits. The Court asserted that Congress's ability to set time limits is a "matter of detail" that is "incident of its power to designate the mode of ratification."9 4 The connection between time
limits and "modes of ratification," however, proves nonexistent
and fails to support the Court's argument.
Article V of the Constitution specifically sets out two "modes"
for ratification of amendments-by state legislatures or state
conventions. 5 Article V leaves it to Congress to choose the mode
of ratification--"as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may
be proposed."9 6 This invitation for Congress to choose who should
ratify the proposed amendment (legislatures or conventions) is
entirely distinct from the question of when ratification shall occur.97 There is no support in Article V for blurring this line, as the
Dillon Court did in linking time limits to the question of "Who"
should ratify. This is particularly true when one considers that
the two stated "modes of ratification" look nothing like the power
to say when and everything like the power to say who.
The remaining piece of support for Dillon's holding is that
time limits are a mere "matter of detail." When the Court made
this finding, it was historically accurate. Every previous amendment either had been ratified quickly or seemingly had no potential for ratification within seven years.9" But since Dillon, history
US Const, Art V.
The idea that when ratified really means when ratified according to the terms of
Congress is unconvincing. Such contingency would likely be a substantive step in the
amendment process that the Framers would have explicitly added, especially considering
that the Framers explicitly gave Congress the power to determine who should ratify and
ignored any mention of when.
'Dillon, 256 US at 376.
' US Const, Art V ("The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution.... which shall be valid...
when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions
in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by
the Congress.").
96Id.

' Dellinger supports this distinction. See Dellinger, 97 Harv L Rev at 409 n 120 (cited

in note 38).
' See Vile, Encyclopedia of ConstitutionalAmendments, ProposedAmendments, and
Amending Issues, 1789-1995 Appendix B at 361 (cited in note 13). The amendments pro-
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has proven that time limits are not a "matter of detail." They disrupt the Article V balance of power in a way that could be harmful to our constitutional system.
2.

History's lessons: Not just a matter of detail.

The expiration of the Equal Rights Amendment showed that
time limits can have significant effects. The ERA was the first
proposed amendment to expire before reaching a congressionally
imposed deadline. When the amendment expired, it was only
three states short of ratification.99
The potential for time limits to kill amendments seems obvious and intuitive. If an amendment expires before ratification,
like the ERA did, it may deprive the States of a chance to ratify
an amendment that they believe is necessary. Time limits can
also hinder the States' ability to force Congress into creating opportunities to amend the Constitution. Congress can create a
backhanded way of destroying an amendment by not giving the
States sufficient time to ratify. Even the conventional seven
years, arguably, might not be enough. Consensus on amendmentworthy issues could take longer than seven years to develop,"°°
especially considering the busy schedules and infrequent meetings of state legislatures.' Thus, time limits enable Congress to
propose the amendment and reap political gains from doing so
posed but not ratified-the other Madison amendment and the 1810 Titles of Nobility
Amendment-had not been ratified by any states in over one hundred years. See Richard
B. Bernstein, Amending America 45-46, 177-78 (Times Books 1993). The 1861 slavery
amendment was rendered moot by the Thirteenth Amendment and, because it prohibited
Congress from banning slavery, must have seemed (even in 1921) to be an extremely unlikely candidate for ratification. At the time the current Twenty-seventh Amendment had
received only one ratification since 1791, a mysterious but seemingly harmless ratification
by Ohio in 1873.
Held, Herndon, and Stager, 3 Wm & Mary J Women & L at 117 (cited in note 88).
"®Seenotes 75 and 152 and accompanying text.
.. 'The possibility that Congress could deprive the States of an amendment the States
demanded was of utmost concern to the Framers. This was the reason for allowing twothirds of the States to propose amendments by application to Congress. After Madison's
original version of Article V was proposed to the convention, George Mason of Virginia
objected because Congress had the sole power to propose amendments. See Max Farrand,
ed, 1 The Records of The FederalConvention of 1787 202-03 (Yale 1937) (noting that "Mason urged the necessity" of a provision to allow proposal and ratification of amendments
without the consent of the Congress because "[flt would be improper to require the consent
of the Natl. Legislature, because they may abuse their power, and refuse their consent on
that very account").
While this provision of Article V does help guard against that problem, it is clearly not
the only protection built into the constitutional system. History has demonstrated that
political pressure from the States has been the most important method of forcing Congress
to propose amendments. In fact, no amendment has ever been proposed by application of
two-thirds of the States.
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while avoiding political pressure and .accountability for not passing the amendment. At the same time, time limits can deny the
States the full opportunity to make the amendment part of the
Constitution.
Although these anti-amendment effects have been considered
by the Court and tested by history," 2 time limits have other effects. During the ERA struggle, it became evident that time limits may actually promote the passage of amendments by altering
(impermissibly) the balance of power struck in Article V. As explained below, time limits shift power reserved to the Statesand the people-to the Congress.
a) Time limits affect the likelihood of proposal by Congress.
The practice of inserting time limits enables Congress to be less
careful with the amendments it proposes and makes it easier for
amendments to pass Congress. For example, when the ERA was
first proposed, many in Congress objected to the lack of a provision limiting the time for ratification.0 3 Representative Martha
Griffiths, sponsor of the amendment in the House, said a time
limit was necessary to silence the objections of many in Congress. O Similarly, during the struggle to get votes for passage of
the Eighteenth Amendment, Senator Wesley Jones, who initially
opposed the addition of a time limit, changed his mind; he explained: "Everybody recognizes that it is very difficult to get a
two-thirds vote in the Senate upon a proposition about which
there is serious controversy. A very careful investigation has convinced some of us that a two-thirds vote is very uncertain unless
this [time] limitation is put on."' 5 Thus, time limits, at the margins, can convince undecided or uncertain congressmen to vote for
an amendment they might otherwise oppose.
The Senate discussion following Jones's pronouncement echoed most Senators' intuitions about time limits-time limits reduce the chances for an amendment's ratification. Senator James
Vardaman, who was opposed to the time limit but was in favor of
the Eighteenth Amendment, said the time limit threatened the
amendment's ratification because Congress would have to re-pass
the amendment if it was not ratified within the time limit.0 6

"See Dillon, 256 US at 376; 55 Cong Rec S 5649 (statement of Sen Borah) (cited in
note 9).
"See, for example, 116 Cong Rec H 28012 (Aug 10, 1970) (statement of Rep Celler);
116 Cong Rec S 35959 (Oct 9, 1970) (statement of Sen Cook) (responding to objection of
lack of time limit by arguing it was not necessary).
..117 Cong Rec H 35814-15 (Oct 12, 1971) (statement of Rep Griffiths).
" 55 Cong Rec S 5658 (Aug 1, 1917) (statement of Sen Jones).
"Id at 5658-59 (statement of Sen Vardaman).
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Senator William Stone, seeing past the intuition, defended Senator Jones's reasoning: "Senators on the floor and otherwise have
given assurance that they would vote for the joint resolution if it
were [ I amended" to include a time limit. 17 For Senators Stone
and Jones and others, the addition of a time limit would ensure
an otherwise doubtful passage of the Eighteenth Amendment.
Madison wrote that the wisdom of the Constitution, in part,
was its difficulty to amend. °8 The Framers certainly intended the
amendment process to be difficult, as evidenced by the supermajority requirements of Article V. The experiences of the ERA
and the Eighteenth Amendment suggest that members of Congress are more likely to vote for an amendment if it has a time
limit. Thus, a time limit makes it more likely that an amendment
will pass Congress. Several motivating factors might explain this
phenomenon. Individual congressmen might fear the amendment
will not be ratified and do not want the amendment floating
around indefinitely;0 9 a time limit will ensure the proposed
amendment's expiration at some point. Or perhaps Congress only
wants the amendment if the States ratify it quickly. Quick ratification will allow members of Congress to take political credit for
the amendment, or possibly to implement it while they are still in
Congress."'

Time limits are no "matter of detail"-rather, they make
congressional passage of an amendment significantly easier.
Time limits enabled the ERA and the Eighteenth Amendment,
and perhaps others, to pass the Congress where they otherwise
would not have.
b) Time limits take power away from the States. Time limits

also infringe upon the States' participation in the ratification process and deprive them of a fundamental constitutional power. As
Senator Borah explained:
We having submitted [the Eighteenth Amendment] to the
States, it is in the possession of the States, and we can not
..
,Id at 5659 (statement of Sen Stone).
'"Federalist 43 (Madison), in Clinton Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers 271, 278
(Mentor 1961) (arguing that the constitutional amendment process should not be too easy,
lest the Constitution become "too mutable").
'"'The initial motivation for the time limit on the Eighteenth Amendment was Senator
Ashurses discussion of the proposed amendments of 1789 that
are before the American people now and have been for 128 years, and are subject to
ratification or rejection by the states .... I am prepared to and will support an
amendment limiting the time... so that we will not hand down to posterity a conglomerate mass of amendments floating around in a cloudy, nebulous, hazy way.
55 Cong Rec S 5556-57 (Aug 1, 1917) (statement of Sen Ashurst).
. See note 156 for an example.
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control it. They have a perfect right to say, "We shall ratify
this now" or 'We shall ratify it in 10 years from now," and
when they shall ratify it they will have acted in accordance
with the provisions of the Constitution of the United
States."'
With time limits, States no longer retain exclusive control
over amendments after they have been proposed by Congress.
The Twenty-seventh and Child Labor Amendments show that it
is not exceptional for a State to ratify an amendment long after it
is proposed by Congress. If Congress can put an expiration date
on the amendment, the Constitution's grant of exclusive control
to the States is lost.
When the Dillon Court considered time limits and the effect
they have on the procedural process, it worried about congressional "encroachment" on the States. The Court wanted to guard
against ratification of an amendment that did not have a "contemporaneous" consensus, as it wanted to avoid Congress passing
an amendment and slowly convincing the required states to ratify, thereby achieving ratification without the actual support of
the people." 2 But the Dillon Court made a crucial miscalculation
by requiring "contemporaneous" ratification-its solution exacerbates the problem it purports to solve. As demonstrated below,
time limits make encroachment more likely because Congress can
pass amendments without having to consider their content and
can force ratification before States have time for "mature consideration.""' In this manner, time limits decrease States' power
over the amendment process.
c) Time limits prevent full deliberation.Time limits may force4
States to ratify an amendment without "mature consideration.""

. 55 Cong Rec S 5649 (statement of Sen Borah) (cited in note 9).
"The following example illustrates this point. At any one time, 25 percent of all state
legislatures will support amendment X. Every five years, each state legislature changes,
and has the potential to ratify an amendment that the previous legislature did not ratify.
Assume each new legislature's decision is independent of the decision of the previous legislature of that state. In 1917, with forty-eight states, thirty-six were needed for ratification. Under this example (assuming states could not rescind their ratification), after
twenty-five years (five generations of state legislatures) the amendment would become
law, despite the fact that only 25 percent of the legislatures supported it at any one time.
The Dillon Court was considering such a problem when it talked about "reflecting the will
of the people... which of course ratification scattered throughout a long series of years
would not do." 256 US at 375.
"'At least some members of Congress have realized this and attempted to capitalize
on this theory. During the balanced budget amendment debate, an effort was made to
limit the ratification period to three years, for the purpose of forcing the States to either
"fish or cut bait." 143 Cong Rec S 1701-02 (Feb 27, 1997) (statement of Sen Feingold).
.. Federalist 85 (Hamilton), in Rossiter, ed, The FederalistPapers 520, 525 (cited in
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For example, as the deadline for the original ERA neared, many
supporters opposed an extension as they realized that the sevenyear deadline imposed a sense of urgency and momentum that
would boost the chances for ratification. Extension of the deadline, they worried, would kill the momentum and thus the
amendment." 5
The Framers feared that the amendment process would be
an "encroachment[ I of the national authority.""6 That is, Congress would expand its powers by railroading the States into approving constitutional amendments. The Dillon Court may have
shared this concern, for if the problem of "encroachment of the
national authority" were not a concern, there would have been no
need for the Dillon Court to require that the time limit be "reasonable."
On the face of things, there is little, if any, difference between not proposing an amendment and proposing an amendment with an unreasonably short time limit for ratification; in
both cases, there will be no amendment. Going deeper, however,
it becomes evident that the time limit, instead of making the
amendment a dead letter, could lead to hasty ratification by the
States. But this problem is not cured by giving the States any set
amount of time to ratify (whether that time is sufficient or not),
because an unratified amendment with a time limit still has a
definite expiration date. Hasty ratification could presumably occur near or at the end of the ratification window, after States realize they must either ratify or lose the chance to do so."' States
should never have to make this choice-there should always be a
"tomorrow" for them to ratify. States should make ratification decisions solely on their reasoned approval of the amendment, and
not fear or haste.
The Framers tried to guard against this potential for ratification without "mature consideration" by giving the States control
of the second half of the amendment process and requiring that
three-fourths of the States ratify. History suggests that time limnote 108).
"See Larry Steinberg, The Long Haul for ERA-And Now, Division in the Ranks, 9
Natl L J 2006 (Dec 31, 1977).
".Federalist 85 (Hamilton) at 526 (cited in note 114).
'A response to this argument might be that an undecided State will simply fail to act
on the amendment. But, because of the supermajority requirements of ratification, an undecided State may find it politically neutral, and easier, to vote "yes" on ratification, instead of being one of the few States to block a popular amendment by failing to ratify before expiration. The expiration date could thus encourage the State to pass the amendment, whereas if there were no deadline, the State would never take the affirmative step
to ratify-the affirmative, unpressured step that the Constitution requires.
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its have the potential to encroach upon this power of the States
by forcing them to ratify out of fear that it may be their only
chance. This impulse exists regardless of the time the States have
already had to consider the amendment. Such a disruption in the
balance of power between the States and Congress seriously undermines the Framers' concerns about Article V. 8
III. A NEW THEORY OF DILLON
Putting aside Dillon and Coleman, there is little authoritative precedent to analyze the constitutionality of time limits on
amendments. But, as the previous Part argued, time limits affect
our understanding of Article V by changing the way the amendment process works. This Part analyzes the constitutionality of
time limits in a new way-considering their effects by searching
for guidance from Supreme Court precedents interpreting
Article I.
A. Article V and Article I Analogies
1.

Similarities in power structures.

The Constitution created two versions of separation of powers. Horizontal separation divides power among the three equal
branches of the federal government: Congress, the Executive, and
the Judiciary. Vertical separation, also known as federalism, divides power between the Federal Government and the States.
Under the latter, power is not equal, for federal law is supreme
(yet limited in scope) whereas state law is inferior (yet unlimited
in scope)." 9 Article V does not neatly fit within this framework,
because it combines both the power balance of horizontal separation of powers with the traditional players of federalism.
In analyzing the structure of Article V, it seems likely that
the Court would pay more attention to the power structures than
to the participants. There is certainly a federalism element in Artide V, 20 and "encroachment" of the national authority is still a
..See Federalist 85 (Hamilton) at 526 (cited in note 114) (speaking of the States' role
in the amendment process to further the "general liberty or security of the people" and the
hope that State legislatures will "erect barriers against the encroachments of the national
authority").
.See Edward H. Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76 Colum L Rev 371,
376(1976).
"The federal element of Article V is apparent in its structure--States, not the people,
do the ratilying. Furthermore, the required three-fourths supermajority demonstrates the
importance of State assent. See William S. Livingston, Federalism and Constitutional
Change, ch 5 at 232-37 (Oxford 1956). Still, this federalist aspect is a part of the procedural structure, not the power allocations. The fact that the States have the ratification
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concern. But because of the similarities in power allocations, the
only way to analyze whether "encroachment" has occurred is
through a "separation of powers" lens. That Congress is the participant here is merely a red herring-in proposing amendments
it does not represent the federal government. 2 ' Thus federalism
is not the appropriate structural framework for analysis.
A proper analysis of Article V focuses on the separation of
powers framework. Like the three coequal branches of the federal
government, Article V players work on a level playing field. Unlike the federal structure where only the national government's
powers are defined, each participant in the amendment process
has a constitutionally defined role: Congress proposes amendments; the States ratify them.'2 2
The Article V procedure of congressional proposal is not
unique in the Constitution. It is akin to the major source of Congress's power under the Constitution, that of lawmaking. When
Congress proposes laws, it presents them to the President, who
can either accept or reject them. This procedure, found in the
Presentment Clause of Article I,123 is strikingly similar to the
amendment procedure of Article V, where Congress proposes
amendments and the States either accept or reject them. In both
cases, Congress must initiate or propose and another actor must
accept or reject the proposal. Both procedures also involve a constitutionally delineated balance of power within a procedure designed to produce (some form of) legislation. As such, cases that
interpret the Presentment Clause should be considered when
analyzing analogous issues in Article V.
2.

Separation of powers and individual liberty concerns in
Articles I and V.

James Madison wrote that the "accumulation of all powers,
legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether
of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or
elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny."124 The protection of individual liberty is a central goal of
role is inconsequential for separation of powers analysis. If the President or the Judiciary
were assigned the power to ratify under Article V, time limits would be equally impermissible if they infringed upon that power in the same way they currently infringe upon the
States' power.
"1 See United States v Sprague, 282 US 716, 733 (1931) ("Article IV] is a grant of
authority by the people to Congress, and not to the United States.").
1
" Of course, the States can also propose a convention, but as this has never happened,
it is outside the scope of this Comment. See US Const, Art V.

'US Const, Art I, § 7.
'Federalist 47 (Madison), in Rossiter, ed, The FederalistPapers 300, 301 (cited in
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the separation of powers doctrine, an idea often expressed by the
Supreme Court.'25
For this reason, separation of powers jurisprudence is highly
relevant to Article V. The Supreme Court has emphatically held
that accumulation of excessive lawmaking power in the hands of
Congress violates the separation of powers.'26 It follows that accumulation of excessive power in the hands of Congress for the
purpose of making constitutional amendments also violates the
separation of powers. Power to make amendments, if unchecked,
is even more of a threat to individual liberty than lawmaking
power-it involves the power to change the entire framework of
democratic protections that our Constitution grants.
B.

Applying Article I Precedents to Article V

There is no jurisprudence analyzing the "separation of powers" within Article V. Article I Presentment Clause jurisprudence,
however, is very instructive on Article V "separation of powers"
issues, because it addresses similar deviations from a procedural
process and similar concerns that arise from the deviation.
The Supreme Court has only twice addressed deviations from
the Presentment Clause in a manner relevant to the time limits
issue. 2 ' Both cases are recent and implicate Article I separation
of powers issues where encroachment of individual liberty is of
special concern.

note 108).
"See Myers v United States, 272 US 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis dissenting) ("The doctrine of separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was, not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the governmental powers among three departments, to save the people from autocracy."); Dennis v Hig-

gins, 498 US 439, 461-62 (1991) (Kennedy dissenting) ("In a very fundamental sense,
separation of powers is designed to secure individual liberty."); Metropolitan Washington
Airports Authority v Citizens for the Abatement ofAircraft Noise, 501 US 252, 272 (1991)
("The ultimate purpose of this separation of powers is to protect the liberty and security of
the governed."); Plaut v Spendthrift Farm, 514 US 211, 241 (1995) (Breyer concurring)
("Mhe statutory provision here at issue.., violates a basic 'separation-of-powers' principle-one intended to protect individual liberty.").
'See Part HI.B.1.
'"Here "relevant" is defined as a deviation from the procedure of the Presentment
Clause. Issues surrounding the pocket veto and adjournment of the Congress do not appear relevant-these cases rest solely on an interpretation of the specific ten day requirement and the President's ability to return bills while Congress is adjourned. See The
Pocket Veto Case, 279 US 655, 674 (1929); Wright v United States, 302 US 583, 598 (1938).
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INS v Chadha.

In INS v Chadha," a simple majority of the House of Representatives "vetoed" the suspension of the deportation of an Indian
immigrant under a statute that allowed either chamber of Congress to override the decision of the immigration judge who had
suspended a deportation proceeding.129 Chadha challenged his
deportation by arguing that the "legislative veto" violated the
Presentment Clause of Article I, which provides: "Every Order,
Resolution, or vote... shall be presented to the President of the
United States." 3 ' The Court agreed with Chadha and held the
"legislative veto" unconstitutional.'
The Court in Chadharecognized the similarity between Article V and Article I. It examined other constitutional procedures
that do not require presidential approval and found that each
provided an alternative check on power. In turning to Article V,
the Court noted, "an amendment ...

is subject to two alternate

protections. First, a constitutional amendment must command
the votes of two-thirds of each House. Second, three-fourths of the
states must ratify."'32 According to the Court, State ratification
and Presidential approval serve the same purpose-to "check"
Congress's legislative power. Thus, it seems likely the Court
would apply the same principles in both contexts to determine
whether that constitutional check has been unconstitutionally
abridged. In this regard, Chadha's analysis is quite relevant to
Article V.
In Chadha, it did not matter that the legislative veto device
was only a "convenient shortcut."'33 In an article discussing the
case, then-Judge Stephen Breyer wrote: "The most important feature of that decision, in my view, is that its holding that the veto
is unconstitutional does not turn upon any fact concerning the
veto's origin, its purposes, or its balance of power effects."" This
is particularly relevant when one considers that Congress developed time limits to prevent amendments from existing in a
"nebulous" way indefinitely before the States. The convenience of
2462 US 919 (1983) (holding Section 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act, which allowed either house of Congress to invalidate decisions of immigration judges,
unconstitutional on separation of powers grounds).
' Id at 924-25.

'US Const, Art I, § 7, cl 3.
Chadha,462 US at 959.
"Id at 956 n 21.
..Id at 958-59.
"Stephen Breyer, The Legislative Veto After Chadha, 72 Georgetown L J 785, 790
"'

(1984).
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a time limit to prevent this problem is irrelevant. Like the shortcut aspect of the legislative veto, if time limits' convenience forces
a deviation from the formal procedure the Constitution demands,
they violate the Constitution by upsetting the prescribed balance
of power.'35
Moreover, in Chadha the Court also noted that the "President's participation in the legislative process was to protect the
Executive Branch from Congress."" 6 Similarly, the Framers designed the participation of the States in the amendment process
to force Congress to consider the States' views on amendments. 37
In both cases, the constitutional text ensures that each actor has
a meaningful opportunity to express its views and protect its interests. Deviations in favor of one actor's interests (Congress's)
come at the expense of the other's (the President's, the States').
Interestingly, Chadha was recently invoked during a Senate
discussion of Congress's Article V powers. During the debate over
the Balanced Budget Amendment in 1995, Senator Tom Daschle
offered a "right-to-know" amendment to the budget amendment.
Daschle's amendment would have forced Congress, if it had
passed the budget amendment, to pass a resolution explaining
how it planned to balance the budget before it submitted the
budget amendment to the States for ratification. 3 ' Speaking
against the Daschle proposal as an unconstitutional alteration of
Article V, Senate Judiciary Chairman Orrin Hatch invoked
Chadhato defend his view that "Congress may not alter, expand,
or restrict, procedures established and explicitly mandated by the
Constitution." 9
Under the Chadha analysis, time limits appear to be unconstitutional. Chadha establishes that the separation of powers requires adherence to formal constitutional power structures. Time
limits deviate from the constitutional power structures of Article
V by altering the balance of power between the Congress and the
States. Therefore, they must fail under the Chadhaanalysis.

'"See Chadha, 462 US at 951 ("It emerges clearly that the prescription for legislative
action... represents the Framers' decision that the legislative power of the Federal Government be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought, and exhaustively considered,
procedure.").
138Id.
'See Federalist 85 (Hamilton) at 525-26 (cited in note 114).
"It was widely suspected, for good reason, that the intent of the amendment was either to kill or to slow ratification of the amendment. See Senate Democrats Fall Short on
Forcing Budget Details; GOP Majority Turns Down Proposalfor Explanation in Advance
of ConstitutionalAmendment, Wash Post A4 (Feb 9, 1995).
' 141 Cong Rec S 2301 (Feb 8, 1995) (statement of Sen Hatch), citing Chadha. See
also Clinton, 118 S Ct at 2188.
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Clinton v City of New York.

Clinton v City of New York 4 ° has even greater implications
for Dillon's holding. In Clinton, the Court considered the Line
Item Veto Act,' 4 ' which allowed the President to delete individual
items from budgets submitted to him by Congress.
Justice
Stevens, writing for the Court, examined Article I and noted: "[It
is silent on the subject of unilateral Presidential action that either repeals or amends parts of duly enacted statutes." 4 ' Similarly, in the Article V context the Dillon Court had observed:
"[T]he Constitution contains no express provision on the subject."' 4 Yet the Court in Dillon and Clinton drew opposite conclusions on the meaning of textual silence. Clinton noted that
"[there are powerful reasons for construing constitutional silence
on this profoundly important issue as equivalent to an express
prohibition." 45 In contrast, Dillon concluded, 'That the Constitution contains no express provision on the subject is not in itself
4
controlling.""
The decisions split over whether a procedural disruption is
allowed if it is not specifically authorized in the Constitution. The
Clinton Court refused to allow the disruption simply because the
Constitution did not expressly prohibit it. According to the Court,
such a disruption could only be permitted if explicitly authorized
in the Constitution's text. Yet Dillon held exactly the opposite:
one player may alter the procedure if there is no express Constitutional prohibition.
The reason for the difference between the holdings is readily
found: today the Court understands that the procedural disruption effects--or at least has the potential to effect-a meaningful
change in the balance of power between the two actors. For this
reason, no matter how friendly or convenient the procedural
change, the Court refuses to allow the disruption. Because the
Dillon Court saw no impact on the balance of power, it allowed
the procedural alteration. Revisiting the reasoning of Chadha, in
Clinton Justice Stevens speaks of the "finely wrought" procedure

. 118 S Ct 2091 (1998) (holding that the Line Item Veto Act unconstitutionally violates the Presentment Clause by departing from the constitutional procedure for enactment of laws).
..2 USCA § 691 et seq (1996 & Supp 1998).
"Id. See also Clinton, 118 S Ct at 2102.
" 118 S Ct at 2103.
'"Dillon, 256 US at 373.
'Clinton, 118 S Ct at 2103.
"Dillon, 256 US at 373.
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This "finely wrought" proce-

dure was intended to protect both branches' interests. Article V
has an explicit formal procedure no less "finely wrought" than the
procedures of Article I.148

If the issues in the cases are so similar, how did the Court
come to such different conclusions? First, in Clinton, the Court
was presented with the substantive effects of the procedural
change, while in Dillon it was not. In the line-item veto case, the
President eliminated items from the budget, thus affecting the
substance of the final budget; the plaintiffs represented parties
who suffered legal injury because they lost tax benefits that they
would have received had the line-item veto not existed. 4 1 In contrast, when the Dillon Court examined time limits, it saw no substantive effects caused by the procedural alterations of Article V
because (1) the amendment at issue was ratified long before the
time limit expired, 5 ° and (2) time limits were new, and the Court
did not understand the effects they could have, as every previous
amendment had either garnered ratification well within seven
years or had failed. 5 ' The Court did not anticipate the impact
time limits would have on the Child Labor Amendment, the
Madison Pay Amendment, and the Equal Rights Amendment. 5 '
Dillon allowed alteration of the Article V procedure to favor
congressional passage of amendments. Today the Court likely
would not allow such a result, as it did not in Clinton. Justice
Kennedy, in his Clinton concurrence, wrote:
Separation of powers operates on a vertical axis as well, between each branch and the citizens in whose interest powers
must be exercised. The citizen has a vital interest in the
Clinton, 118 S Ct at 2104, quoting Chadha,462 US at 951.

147

"See also Sprague, 282 US at 732 (noting that Article V was drawn with "meticulous

care").
1

Clinton, 118 S Ct at 2099-2102.

'Dillon, 256 US at 376.
"The longest ratification period up until 1921 was the Sixteenth Amendment, which
passed Congress on July 12, 1909, and was ratified on February 3, 1913. See Vile, Encyclopedia of ConstitutionalAmendments, Proposed Amendments, and Amending Issues,
1789-1995 at 361 (cited in note 13).
..All three of these amendments had significant potential for ratification after a period of seven years. The Child Labor Amendment gained momentum ten years after proposal, and likely would have been ratified had the Court not made its purpose redundant
in United States v Darby, 312 US 100, 115 (1941) (overruling Hammer v Dagenhart,247
US 251 (1918), and allowing Congress to set labor standards for goods shipped in interstate commerce). The Madison amendment, of course, was ratified long after seven years
expired-in fact, over two hundred years had passed. The potential for ERA to be ratified
after seven years is obvious from the fact that Congress thought enough of the potential to
extend the deadline.
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regularity of the exercise of governmental power. If this
point was not clear before Chadha,it should have been so afterwards.... By increasing the power of the President beyond what the Framers envisioned, the statute compromises
the political liberty of our citizens, liberty which the separation of powers seeks to secure.15 3
Justice Kennedy's opinion reiterates that the Court will not
permit a transgression of the procedural process that allows a
stronger political actor, be it the President (as in Clinton), or the
Congress (as in Dillon), to enact laws or amendments more easily. With such procedural transgressions, "]iberty is always at
54
stake."
IV. FURTHER ARGUTMENTS AGAINST TIME LIMITS
If presented with the issue today, the Court likely would not
approve of time limits on constitutional amendments. Yet, Congress regularly inserts them in the constitutional amendments it
proposes. During the short-lived debate on Senator Feingold's attempt to limit the ratification time of the Balanced Budget
Amendment to three years, the main argument against the
change was its departure from "convention."5 5 Senator Hatch, in
arguing to keep the seven-year limit, noted that "of the 107 Constitutional amendments introduced in the last Congress... only
1 contained a time limitation that varied from the conventional 7year limitation."'5 6
The most repeated argument in favor of time limits is that
they make the amendment process certain and definite. Senator
Ashurst's fear of amendments floating around in a "nebulous,
hazy way" seems legitimate, especially in light of the ratification
of the Twenty-seventh Amendment. 57 This argument, however,
illustrates why time limits damage the Constitution.
If Congress is concerned about the States ratifying an
amendment after seven years, why propose the amendment at
all? If the proposed amendment might not be a good idea in seven
years, what will happen if it is ratified? It is far better to have an
"Clinton, 118 S Ct at 2110 (Kennedy concurring).

"Id at 2109.
143 Cong Rec S 1702 (Feb 27, 1997) (statement of Sen Hatch).
"'Id. The one amendment introduced with a different time limit was an obscure balanced budget amendment introduced by Congressman Andy Jacobs. H J Res 31, 104th
Cong, 1st Sess (1995). The reason for the shortened time limit, however, was primarily because Jacobs was planning to retire from Congress within the next two years. Telephone
Interview with Andy Jacobs (Sept 17, 1998).
' 55 Cong Rec S 5557 (statement of Sen Ashurst) (cited in note 109).
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aged proposal floating around than an unwise amendment permanently a part of the Constitution. Chief Justice John Marshall
said that the Constitution is "intended to endure for ages to
come." 5 ' Amendments that might not be a good idea in seven
years (or even longer) threaten the Constitution's endurance.
Ironically, the first amendment to be proposed with a time
limit-the Prohibition Amendment--exists today as the quintessential hasty error of constitutional history. The record suggests
that had Congress not been able to put a time limit on the
amendment, it might not have passed.'59 But Congress, driven by
the issue of the day and able to ensure that the proposed amendment would not unexpectedly reach beyond its short-lived usefulness, proposed an amendment to address that issue-only to have
to repeal the amendment eleven years later. 60
Time limits allow Congress to address issues of the day without sufficient deliberation. This was one of Madison's greatest
fears; he cautioned against an amendment mode of "extreme facility, which would render the Constitution too mutable." 6 ' Joseph Story noted that the Constitution should be protected from
"too hasty exercise of the power [to amend], under temporary discontents or excitements." 62 Recent "amendment fever"'63 in Congress has shown the current generation of Americans the potential for hasty amendments to be proposed and possibly ratified.
Many commentators and prominent legal scholars have spoken out against these recent attempts to amend the Constitution.' Although politics will decide whether the current Constitution remains intact or is stricken with amendment fever, legal
scholars, Congress, and the Court need to ensure the amendment
fight is played by the rules as they were envisioned by the Framers. Strict adherence to Article V demands that no limit be placed
on the States' ratification of constitutional amendments. Such
adherence to Article V will help curb the negative effects of the
'McCulloch v Maryland, 17 US (4 Wheat) 316, 415 (1819).
'"See 55 Cong Rec S 5658 (statement of Sen Jones) (cited in note 105); id at 5659
(statement of Sen Stone) (cited in note 107).
"Indeed, efforts to modify or repeal the Eighteenth Amendment started just a few
years after its proposal. See Vile, Encyclopedia of ConstitutionalAmendments, Proposed
Amendments, and Amending Issues, 1789-1995 at 372-73 (cited in note 13).
"Federalist 43 (Madison) at 278 (cited in note 108) (arguing that Article V was balanced as to not let the Constitution be too mutable, but also not too difficult to amend for
"useful alterations").
"Joseph Story, 3 Commentaries on the Constitution § 1824 at 688 (Hilliard, Gray
1833).
"See Sullivan, 17 Cardozo L Rev 691 (cited in note 1).
'"See id; Mikva, Edwards, and Courter, CasualUse of Amendments Poses Threat,Nati
L J at A21 (cited in note 1).
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recent popularity of amendments and preserve the amendment
power for issues that transcend the interests of current generations.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court, in the 1921 decision Dillon v Gloss,
permitted Congress to attach time limits on the States' ratification of constitutional amendments, calling them "matter[s] of detail" that are "incident of [Congress's] power to designate the
mode of ratification."'6 5 The Court, at that time, could not fully
appreciate the power of time limits on constitutional amendments
to disrupt and damage the amendment process. Logic tells us
that a ratification time limit can affect an amendment by removing it from the States' consideration before sufficient States
decide to ratify, but amendment history since Dillon has shown
that time limits can also raise the likelihood of an amendment's
proposal and ratification-by allowing Congress to pass the
amendment without having to adequately consider its future potential, and potentially forcing the States to ratify without full
consideration. This disruption in the "balance of power" that Article V created for the amendment process would not be permitted
by the Supreme Court today, in light of the Court's recent statements on the importance of strict maintenance of constitutional
power structures. Strict adherence to Article V and the power
structures embedded within it will prevent hasty use of the
amendment power and preserve the Constitution's timelessness
for generations to come.

"Dillon, 256 US at 376.

